The recent investigative report by The Fourth Estate regarding the Ministry of Roads and Highways has sparked a significant national conversation about the intersection of political promises and administrative reality. The report alleges that between September 2025 and February 2026, the ministry awarded 81 sole sourced contracts valued at over GHS 73 billion, suggesting a departure from President John Mahama’s vow to minimize such procurement methods. However, an objective and critical analysis of the infrastructure landscape reveals that the narrative of a scandal may be secondary to the urgent operational requirements of a nation facing a severe infrastructure deficit.
The Legal Framework and the Urgency Clause
Central to this critique is the interpretation of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663). While The Fourth Estate correctly identifies that competitive bidding is the preferred norm, it underemphasizes Section 40 of the Act. This section explicitly permits single source procurement under conditions of "urgency."
In the context of the Big Push program, the administration is attempting to resolve a decades old backlog of dilapidated roads that pose a direct threat to national security and economic stability. When a project is classified as an urgent intervention to prevent further loss of life or economic stagnation, the transition from a standard six month tendering process to an expedited sole sourcing method is a strategic choice, not necessarily a legal breach. If these 81 contracts received prior approval from the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) based on demonstrated urgency, then the government has acted within the strict confines of the law.
Debunking the Numbers and the Novation Factor
A deeper look into the data suggests that the figure of 81 "new" sole sourced contracts might be statistically misleading. Reports from the Ministry of Roads and Highways indicate that approximately 23 of these projects were not original awards by the current administration. Instead, they were "inherited" projects from the previous NPP government, such as the Suame Interchange and the Ofankor Nsawam road.
These projects were already awarded via sole sourcing by the prior administration but lacked dedicated funding. The current government’s decision to "novate" these contracts (maintaining the existing contractors while securing new funding) technically places them on the list of active contracts, but it does not represent a new procurement decision by the Mahama administration. By failing to distinguish between newly initiated sole sourced contracts and inherited novations, the Fourth Estate analysis lacks the granular accuracy required for a definitive corruption narrative.
Operational Capacity versus Competitive Delay
The Fourth Estate argues that sole sourcing leads to inflated costs, yet the report offers no specific evidence of price padding in these 81 contracts. In major engineering projects, the "lowest bidder" is not always the "best bidder." The Big Push requires contractors with proven equipment, technical expertise, and the financial liquidity to work at an accelerated pace.
Competitive tendering for complex interchanges and intercontinental highways can often stall in the evaluation phase for over a year. For a government that has promised a "Reset" and rapid delivery, waiting 12 to 18 months just to break ground would effectively terminate the possibility of completing the projects within a single term. Prudence, in this case, can be defined as the efficient use of time to deliver quality assets before inflation further erodes the value of the allocated GHS 73 billion.
The Ardent Lens Take
The Fourth Estate report performs a vital watchdog function, but its conclusion that the Big Push is a "factory for sole sourced contracts" ignores the brutal reality of Ghanaian infrastructure development. Prudence is not merely the adherence to a specific procurement method; it is the delivery of value for money and the timely completion of life saving roads.
The real scandal in Ghana is often not how a contract is awarded, but the culture of "abandoned projects" that results from slow, bureaucratic tendering and lack of funding. By prioritizing "competent, experienced, and well resourced" Ghanaian firms and novating inherited projects with secured funding, the Ministry of Roads is opting for a results oriented approach.
The Fourth Estate’s critique focuses heavily on procedural optics while ignoring the fact that these contracts are subject to independent Value for Money audits. Until there is factual evidence of specific price inflation or substandard work, the use of sole sourcing to drive the Big Push must be viewed as a necessary, albeit controversial, tool for national development. The "Reset Agenda" requires speed, and in the world of high stakes infrastructure, speed and sole sourcing are often inseparable.